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Poonch River

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Poonch River
Poonch River

Location
Countries	India, Pakistan
Provinces	Jammu and Kashmir, Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Physical characteristics
Source
• location	Poonch district, Jammu and Kashmir, India
• coordinates	33.64511°N 74.43532°E
Mouth
• location	Mangla Reservoir, Kotli District, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan
• coordinates	33.2896°N 73.7414°ECoordinates: 33.2896°N 73.7414°E

The Poonch River (also known as Punch River, Punch Tohi, Tohi of Punch^[1]^[a]) is a tributary of the Jhelum River that flows through Jammu and Kashmir in India, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir in Pakistan.

Name[edit]

According to Georg Bühler,^[2] the ancient form of the word Tohi is Taushi mentioned in the Rājataraṅgiṇī and the Nīlamata Purāṇa. In the latter work, Āpagā (Aik Nala of Sialkot), Tauśī and Candrabhāgā are named together. Probably, the word is connected with the Sanskrit tuṣāra, 'cold', i.e. 'snow'.

Course[edit]

The river originates in the south-facing foothills of Pir Panjal range, in the areas of Neel-Kanth Gali and Jamian Gali. It is called 'Siran' (Suran) in this area. It flows south and then west until it reaches the town of Poonch, after which it bends southwest, finally draining into the Mangla Reservoir near Chomukh. The towns of Poonch, Sehra, Tatta Pani, Kotli and Mirpur are situated on the banks of this river.^[3]

Tributaries[edit]

Frederic Drew wrote of the Poonch river in 1875:

it drains a large area of mountain country, collecting a number of streams that rise in the lofty Panjäl Range; indeed it combines all those which spring from that part of the Range north or north-west of the branching off of the Ratan ridge. It drains also a considerable area occupied by the mountains of intermediate height, and no small space of the lower, outer, hills.^[4]

AZAD KASHMIR

Tourism in Azad Kashmir

Azad Kashmir is administrative region of Pakistan situated in northern part of the country. The northern part of Azad Jammu and Kashmir encompasses the lower part of the Himalayas, including Jamgarh Peak (15,531 feet, or 4,734 meters). However, Sarwali peak in the Neelum Valley is the highest peak in the state.^[1] Fertile, green, mountainous valleys are characteristic of Azad Kashmir's geography, making it one of the most beautiful regions on the subcontinent.^[2]

The southern parts of Azad Kashmir including Bhimber, Mirpur and Kotli districts has extremely hot weather in summers and moderate cold weather in winters. It receives rains mostly in monsoon weather.

Paddy field in Leepa Valley

In the central and northern parts of state weather remains moderate hot in summers and very cold and chilly in winter. Snow fall also occurs there in December and January.

This region receives rainfall in both winters and summers. Muzaffarabad and Pattan are among the wettest areas of the state. Throughout most of the region, the average rainfall exceeds 1400 mm, with the highest average rainfall occurring near Muzaffarabad (around 1800 mm). During summer, monsoon floods of the Jhelum and Leepa river are common, due to high rainfall and melting snow.

Main places[edit]

Valleys[edit]

Lakes[edit]

Rivers[edit]

References[edit]

^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2015-07-10. Retrieved 2015-06-14.
^ "Azad Kashmir" at britannica.com

External links[edit]

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Tourism in Azad Kashmir

History of Pakistan

This section presents the history of Pakistan from the partition of British India (1947) to the present. For a discussion of the earlier history of the region, see India.

Background to partition

The call for establishing an independent Islamic state on the Indian subcontinent can be traced to a 1930 speech by Sir Muhammad Iqbal, a poet-philosopher and, at the time, president of the All India Muslim League (after Pakistan’s independence, shortened to Muslim League). It was his argument that the four northwestern provinces and regions of British India—i.e., Sind (Sindh), Balochistan, Punjab, and North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)—should one day be joined to become a free and independent Muslim state. The limited character of this proposal can be judged from its geographic rather than demographic dimensions. Iqbal’s Pakistan included only those Muslims residing in the Muslim-majority areas in the northwestern quadrant of the subcontinent. It ignored the millions of other Muslims living throughout the subcontinent, and it certainly did not take into account the Muslim majority of Bengal in the east. Moreover, Iqbal’s vision did not reflect the interests of others outside the Muslim League seeking liberation from colonial rule, and it did not conform to ideas reflected in Islamic expressions that spoke of a single Muslim community (ummah) or people (qawm), explaining in no small way why many other Muslim leaders—e.g., Abul Kalam Azad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and, later, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana—were less than enthused with his proposal.

Also missing at the time was a name to describe such a South Asian country where Muslims would be masters of their own destiny. That task fell to Choudhary Rahmat Ali, a young Muslim student studying at Cambridge in England, who best captured the poet-politician’s yearnings in the single word Pakistan. In a 1933 pamphlet, Now or Never, Rahmat Ali and three Cambridge colleagues coined the name as an acronym for Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, and Indus-Sind, combined with the -stan suffix from Baluchistan (Balochistan). It was later pointed out that, when translated from Urdu, Pakistan could also mean “Land of the Pure.”

The Muslim League and Mohammed Ali Jinnah

Long before the British invaded and seized control of the subcontinent, Muslim armies had conquered the settled populations in the rolling flat land that stretched from the foothills of the Hindu Kush to the city of Delhi and the Indo-Gangetic Plain and eastward to Bengal. The last and most successful of the Muslim conquerors was the Mughal dynasty (1526–1857), which eventually spread its authority over virtually the entire subcontinent. British superiority coincided with Mughal decline, and, following a period of European successes and Mughal failures on the battlefield, the British brought an end to Mughal power. The last Mughal emperor was exiled following the failed Indian Mutiny of 1857–58.

Less than three decades after that revolt, the Indian National Congress was formed to give political representation to British India’s indigenous people. Although membership in the Congress was open to all, Hindu participants overwhelmed the Muslim members. The All India Muslim League, organized in 1906, aimed to give Muslims a voice so as to counter what was then perceived as the growing influence of the Hindus under British rule. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, earlier a prominent Muslim member of the Congress, assumed leadership of the league following his break with Congress leader Mohandas K. Gandhi. A firm believer in the Anglo-Saxon rule of law and a close associate of Iqbal, Jinnah questioned the security of the Muslim minority in an India dominated by essentially Hindu authority. Declaring Islam was endangered by a revived Hindu assertiveness, Jinnah and the league posited a “two-nation theory” that argued Indian Muslims were entitled to—and therefore required—a separate, self-governing state in a reconstituted subcontinent.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah
Pakistan founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah delivering a speech.
Three Lions/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

The British intention to grant self-government to India along the lines of British parliamentary democracy is evident in the Government of India Act of 1935. Up to that time, the question of Hindus and Muslims sharing in the governance of India was generally acceptable, although it was also acknowledged that Hindus more so than Muslims had accommodated themselves to British customs and the colonial manner of administration. Moreover, following the failed Indian Mutiny, Hindus were more eager to adopt British behaviours and ideas, whereas Indian Muslims bore the brunt of British wrath. The Mughal Empire was formally dissolved in 1858, and its last ruler was banished from the subcontinent. Believing they had been singled out for punishment, India’s Muslim population was reluctant to adopt British ways or take advantage of English educational opportunities. As a consequence of these different positions, Hindus advanced under British rule at the expense of their Muslim counterparts, and when Britain opened the civil service to the native population, the Hindus virtually monopolized the postings. Although influential Muslims such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan recognized the growing power imbalance and encouraged Muslims to seek European education and entry into the colonial civil service, they also realized that catching up to the more progressive and advantaged Hindus was an impossible task.

It was this juxtaposition of an emerging feeling of Hindu superiority and a sustained sense among Muslims of inferiority that the All India Muslim League addressed in its claim to represent the Muslims of India. Unlike other Muslim movements of the period, the Muslim League articulated the sentiments of the attentive and at the same time more moderate elements among India’s Muslim population. The Muslim League, with Jinnah as its spokesman, was also the preferred organization from the standpoint of British authority. Unlike Gandhi’s practices of civil disobedience, the lawyer Jinnah (who was called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn, London) was more inclined to promote the rule of law in seeking separation from imperial rule. Jinnah, therefore, was more open to a negotiated settlement, and, indeed, his first instinct was to preserve the unity of India, albeit with adequate safeguards for the Muslim community. For Jinnah, the Lahore (later Pakistan) Resolution of 1940, which called for an independent Muslim state or states in India, did not at first imply the breakup of the Indian union.

World War II (1939–45) proved to be the catalyst for an unanticipated change in political power. Under pressure from a variety of popular national movements—notably those organized by the Congress and led by Gandhi—the war-weakened British were forced to consider abandoning India. In response to the Congress campaign that Britain quit India, London sent a mission headed by Sir Richard Stafford Cripps (the Cripps Mission) to New Delhi in early 1942 with the promise that Congress’s cooperation in the war effort would be rewarded with greater self-rule and possibly even independence when the war ended. Gandhi and the other Congress leaders, however, could not be appeased, and their insistence that Britain allow for a transfer of power while the war raged produced an impasse and the failure of the mission.

During that period, the Jinnah-led Muslim League was substantially less aggressive in seeking immediate British withdrawal. The differences between the two groups were not lost on Britain, and the eventual defeat of Germany and Japan set the scene for the drama that resulted in the partition of British India and the independence of Pakistan. The new postwar Labour Party government of Clement Attlee, succeeding the Conservative Winston Churchill government, was determined to terminate its authority in India. A cabinet mission led by William Pethick-Lawrence was sent in 1946 to discuss and possibly arrange the mechanisms for the transfer of power to indigenous hands. Throughout the deliberations the British had to contend with two prominent players: Gandhi and the Congress and Jinnah and the Muslim League. Jinnah laboured to find a suitable formula that addressed the mutual and different needs of the subcontinent’s two major communities. When Pethick-Lawrence’s mission proved unequal to the task of reconciling the parties, the last chance for a compromise solution was lost. Each of the major actors blamed the other for the breakdown in negotiations, with Jinnah insisting on the realization of the “two-nation theory.” The goal now was nothing less than the creation of a sovereign, independent Pakistan.

Birth of the new state

Like India, Pakistan achieved independence as a dominion within the Commonwealth in August 1947. However, the leaders of the Muslim League rejected Lord Mountbatten, the last British viceroy of India, to be Pakistan’s first governor-general, or head of state—in contrast to the Congress, which made him India’s chief executive. Wary of Britain’s machinations and desirous of rewarding Jinnah—their “Great Leader” (Quaid-e Azam), a title he was given before independence—Pakistanis made him their governor-general; his lieutenant in the party, Liaquat Ali Khan, was named prime minister. Pakistan’s first government, however, had a difficult task before it. Unlike Muhammad Iqbal’s earlier vision for Pakistan, the country had been formed from the two regions where Muslims were the majority—the northwestern portion he had espoused and the territories and the eastern region of Bengal province (which itself had also been divided between India and Pakistan). Pakistan’s two wings, therefore, were separated by some 1,000 miles (1,600 km) of sovereign Indian territory with no simple routes of communication between them. Further complicating the work of the new Pakistani government was the realization that the wealth and resources of British India had been granted to India. Pakistan had little but raw enthusiasm to sustain it, especially during those months immediately following partition. In fact, Pakistan’s survival seemed to hang in the balance. Of all the well-organized provinces of British India, only the comparatively less developed areas of Sind, Balochistan, and the North-West Frontier Province came to Pakistan intact. The otherwise more developed provinces of Punjab and Bengal were divided, and, in the case of Bengal, Pakistan received little more than the densely populated rural hinterland.

Adding to the dilemma of the new and untested Pakistan government was the crisis in Kashmir, which provoked a war between the two neighbouring states in the period immediately following their independence. Both Pakistan and India intended to make Kashmir a component of their respective unions, and the former princely state quickly became disputed territory—with India and Pakistan controlling portions of it—and a flash point for future conflicts. Economically, the situation in Pakistan was desperate; materials from the Indian factories were cut off from Pakistan, disrupting the new country’s meagre industry, commerce, and agriculture. Moreover, the character of the partition and its aftermath had caused the flight of millions of refugees on both sides of the divide, accompanied by terrible massacres. The exodus of such a vast number of desperate people in each direction required an urgent response, which neither country was prepared to manage, least of all Pakistan.

As a consequence of the unresolved war in Kashmir and the communal bloodletting in the streets of both countries, India and Pakistan each came to see the other as its mortal enemy. The Pakistanis had anticipated a division of India’s material, financial, and military assets. In fact, there would be none. New Delhi displayed no intention of dividing the assets of British India with its major adversary, thereby establishing a balance between the two countries. Moreover, India’s superior geopolitical position and, most importantly, its control of the vital rivers that flowed into Pakistan meant that the Muslim country’s water supplies were at the mercy of its larger, hostile neighbour. Pakistan’s condition was so precarious following independence that many observers believed the country could hardly survive six months and that India’s goal of a unified subcontinent remained a distinct possibility.

The early republic

Mohammed Ali Jinnah died in September 1948, only 13 months after Pakistan’s independence. Nevertheless, it was Jinnah’s dynamic personality that sustained the country during those difficult months. Assuming responsibility as the nation’s chief and virtually only decision maker, Jinnah held more than the ceremonial position of his British counterpart in India. But there too lay a special problem. Jinnah’s formidable presence, even though weakened by illness, loomed large over the polity, and the other members of government were totally subordinate to his wishes. Thus, although Pakistan commenced its independent existence as a democratic entity with a parliamentary system, the representative aspects of the political system were muted by the role of the Quaid-e Azam. In effect, Jinnah—not India’s Mountbatten—perpetuated the viceregal tradition that had been central to Britain’s colonial rule. Unlike India, where Gandhi opted to remain outside government and where India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the parliament administered to the country, in Pakistan the parliament and members of the governing cabinet were cast in a subordinate role.

Liaquat Ali Khan

When Jinnah died, a power vacuum was created that his successors in the Muslim League had great difficulty filling. Khwaja Nazimuddin, the chief minister of East Bengal, was called on to take up the office of governor-general. Known for his mild manner, it was assumed Nazimuddin would not interfere with the parliamentary process and would permit the prime minister to govern the country. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, however, lacked the necessary constituency in the regions that formed Pakistan. Nor did he possess Jinnah’s strength of personality. Liaquat therefore was hard put to cope with entrenched and vested interests, particularly in regions where local leaders dominated. Jinnah had worked hard to mollify competing and ambitious provincial leaders, and Liaquat, himself a refugee (muhajir) from India, simply did not have the stature to pick up where Jinnah had left off.

Liaquat was eager to give the country a new constitution, but such an undertaking was delayed by controversy, particularly over the distribution of provincial powers and over representation. Although what had been East Bengal (and became East Pakistan) contained the majority of Pakistan’s population, the Punjab nevertheless judged itself the more significant of the Pakistani provinces. The Punjabis had argued that East Bengal was populated by a significant number of Hindus whose loyalty to the Muslim country was questionable. Any attempt therefore to provide East Bengal with representation commensurate to its population would be challenged by the Punjab. Although Jinnah had voiced the view that Muslims, Hindus, Christians, and all religious denominations were equal citizens in the new Pakistani state, Liaquat could not neutralize this controversy, nor could he resolve the issue of provincial representation. Forced to sell his vision to the people of Pakistan directly, Liaquat engaged in a number of public speaking engagements, and it was at such a meeting, in Rawalpindi in October 1951, that he was killed by an assassin’s bullet.

Political decline and bureaucratic ascendancy

Nazimuddin assumed the premiership on Liaquat’s death, and Ghulam Muhammad took his place as the governor-general. Ghulam Muhammad, a Punjabi, had been Jinnah’s choice to serve as Pakistan’s first finance minister and was an old and successful civil servant. The juxtaposition of these two very different personalities—Nazimuddin, known for his piety and reserved nature, and Ghulam Muhammad, a staunch advocate of strong, efficient administration—was hardly fortuitous. Nazimuddin’s assumption of the office of prime minister meant the country would have a weak head of government, and, with Ghulam Muhammad as governor-general, a strong head of state. Pakistan’s viceregal tradition was again in play.

In 1953 riots erupted in the Punjab, supposedly over a demand by militant Muslim groups that the Aḥmadiyyah sect be declared non-Muslim and that all members of the sect holding public office be dismissed. (Special attention was directed at Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, an Aḥmadiyyah and Pakistan’s first foreign minister.) Nazimuddin was held responsible for the disorder, especially for his inability to quell it, and Ghulam Muhammad took the opportunity to dismiss the prime minister and his government. Although another Bengali, Muhammad Ali Bogra, replaced Nazimuddin, there was no ignoring the fact that the viceregal tradition was continuing to dominate Pakistani political life and that Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat and never truly a politician, with others like him, controlled Pakistan’s destiny.

Muhammad Zafrulla Khan
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, 1948.
AP

Meanwhile, in East Bengal (East Pakistan), considerable opposition had developed against the Muslim League, which had managed the province since independence. This tension was capped in 1952 by a series of riots that sprang from a Muslim League attempt to make Urdu the only national language of Pakistan, although Bengali—the predominant language of the eastern sector—was spoken by a larger proportion of Pakistan’s population. The language riots galvanized the Bengalis, and they rallied behind their more indigenous parties to thwart what they argued was an effort by the West Pakistanis, notably the Punjabis, to transform East Bengal into a distant “colony.”

With a Punjabi bureaucratic elite in firm control of the central government, in March 1954 the last in a series of provincial elections was held in East Bengal. The contest was between the Muslim League government and a “United Front” of parties led by the Krishak Sramik party of Fazlul Haq (Fazl ul-Haq) and the Awami League of Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy, Mujibur Rahman, and Maulana Bhashani. When the ballots were counted, the Muslim League had not only lost the election, it had been virtually eliminated as a viable political force in the province. Fazlul Haq was given the opportunity to form the new provincial government in East Bengal, but, before he could convene his cabinet, riots erupted in the factories south of the East Bengali capital of Dhaka (Dacca). This instability provided the central government with the opportunity to establish “governor’s rule” in the province and overturn the United Front’s electoral victory. Iskander Mirza, a civil servant, former defense secretary, and minister in the central government, was sent to rule over the province until such time as stability could be assured.

Iskander Mirza had no intention of implementing the results of the election, nor did he wish to install a new Muslim League government in East Bengal. But the Muslim League’s defeat and de facto elimination in the province necessitated realigning the Constituent Assembly—still grappling with the drafting of a national constitution—at the centre. Before this could be done, however, the Constituent Assembly moved to curtail Ghulam Muhammad’s viceregal powers. The governor-general’s response to this parliamentary effort to undermine his authority was to dissolve that body and reorganize the central government. The country’s high court cited the extraordinary powers of the chief executive and ruled not to reverse his action. The court, however, insisted that another constituent assembly should be organized and that constitution making should not be interrupted. Ghulam Muhammad assembled a “cabinet of talents” that included major personalities such as Iskander Mirza, Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan (the army chief of staff), and H.S. Suhrawardy (the last chief minister of undivided Bengal, and the only Bengali with national credentials).

In 1955 the bureaucrats who now took control of what remained of the Muslim League combined the four provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit and argued for parity in any future national parliament between West Pakistan and East Bengal (now officially renamed East Pakistan). Ghulam Muhammad, by then seriously ill, was forced to relinquish his office, and Iskander Mirza succeeded to the post of governor-general. In the meantime a new Constituent Assembly was seated; and in 1956 that body, under new leadership but still subject to the power of the bureaucracy—and now to the military as well—completed Pakistan’s long-awaited constitution, using the parity formula that supposedly gave equal power to both wings of the country.

The constitution of 1956 embodied objectives regarding religion and politics that had been set out in the Basic Principles Report published in 1950, one of which was to declare the country an Islamic republic. The national parliament was to comprise one house of 300 members, equally representing East and West Pakistan. Ten additional seats were reserved for women, again with half coming from each region. The prime minister and cabinet were to govern according to the will of the parliament, with the president exercising only reserve powers. Pakistan’s first president was its last governor-general, Iskander Mirza, but at no time did he consider bowing to the wishes of the parliament.

Along with a close associate, Dr. Khan Sahib, a former premier of the North-West Frontier Province, Mirza formed the Republican Party and made Khan Sahib the chief minister of the new province of West Pakistan. The Republican Party was assembled to represent the landed interests in West Pakistan, the basic source of all political power. Never an organized body, the Republican Party lacked an ideology or a platform and merely served the feudal interests in West Pakistan.

Mirza made an alliance between the Republican Party and the East Pakistan Awami League and called on H.S. Suhrawardy to assume the office of prime minister. But the quixotic character of the alliance between the two parties, as well as the distance between the major personalities, produced only a short-lived association. Suhrawardy suffered the same fate as his predecessors and was ousted from office by Mirza without a vote of confidence. Unable to sustain alliances or govern in accordance with the constitution, the central government mirrored the chaos in the provinces. This was especially true in East Pakistan, where even in the absence of the Muslim League the different provincial parties—now further complicated by the formation of the National Awami Party, in 1957—struggled against forces that could not be reconciled. Pakistan was close to becoming unmanageable. The situation had become so grave that Khan Sahib circulated his idea that it was time to cease the political charade and give all power to a dictator.

Military government

In light of such dissent and with secession being voiced in different regions of the country (notably in East Pakistan and the North-West Frontier Province), on October 7, 1958, Mirza proclaimed the 1956 constitution abrogated, closed the national and provincial assemblies, and banned all political party activity. He declared that the country was under martial law and that Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan had been made chief martial-law administrator. Mirza claimed that it was his intention to lift martial law as soon as possible and that a new constitution would be drafted; and on October 27 he swore in a new cabinet, naming Ayub Khan prime minister, while three lieutenant generals were given ministerial posts. The eight civilian members in the cabinet included businessmen and lawyers, one being a young newcomer, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a powerful landlord from Sind province. However, Ayub Khan viewed his being named prime minister as the president’s attempt to end his military career and ultimately to force him into oblivion. Clearly, the country could not afford two paramount rulers at the same time. Therefore, if one had to go, Ayub Khan decided that it should be Mirza. On the evening of October 27, Ayub Khan’s senior generals presented Mirza with an ultimatum of facing permanent exile or prosecution by a military tribunal. Mirza immediately left for London, never again to return to Pakistan. Soon thereafter, Ayub Khan, who now assumed the rank of field marshal, proclaimed his assumption of the presidency.

Mohammad Ayub Khan
Mohammad Ayub Khan.
Courtesy of the Pakistan Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Martial law lasted 44 months. During that time, a number of army officers took over vital civil service posts. Many politicians were excluded from public life under an Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order; a similar purge took place among civil servants. Yet, Ayub Khan argued that Pakistan was not yet ready for a full-blown experiment in parliamentary democracy and that the country required a period of tutelage and honest government before a new constitutional system could be established. He therefore initiated a plan for “basic democracies,” consisting of rural and urban councils directly elected by the people that would be concerned with local governance and would assist in programs of grassroots development. Elections took place in January 1960, and the Basic Democrats, as they became known, were at once asked to endorse and thus legitimate Ayub Khan’s presidency. Of the 80,000 Basic Democrats, 75,283 affirmed their support. Basic democracies was a tiered system inextricably linked to the bureaucracy, and the Basic Democrats occupied the lowest rung of a ladder that was connected to the country’s administrative subdistricts (tehsils, or tahsils), districts, and divisions.

It was soon clear that the real power in the system resided in the bureaucrats who had dominated decision making since colonial times. Nevertheless, the basic democracies system was linked to a public-works program that was sponsored by the United States. The combined effort was meant to confer responsibility for village and municipal development to the local population. Self-reliance was the watchword of the overall program, and Ayub Khan and his advisers, as well as important donor countries, believed the arrangement would provide material benefits and possibly even expose people to self-governing experiences.

Ayub Khan also established a constitutional commission to advise on a form of government more appropriate to the country’s political culture, and his regime introduced a number of reforms. Not the least of these was the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, which restricted polygamy and provided more rights and protection for women. He also authorized the development of family-planning programs that were aimed at tackling the dilemma of Pakistan’s growing population. Such actions angered the more conservative and religiously disposed members of society, who also swelled the ranks of the opposition. Under pressure to make amends and to placate the guardians of Islamic tradition, the family-planning program was eventually scrapped.

An important feature of the Ayub Khan regime was the quickening pace of economic growth. During the initial phase of independence, the annual growth rate was less than 3 percent, and that was scarcely ahead of the rate of population growth. Just prior to the military coup, the rate of growth was even smaller. During the Ayub Khan era—with assistance from external sources, notably the United States—the country accelerated economic growth, and by 1965 it had advanced to more than 6 percent per annum. Development was particularly vigorous in the manufacturing sector, but considerable attention was also given to agriculture. U.S. assistance was especially prominent in combating water logging and salinity problems that resulted from irrigation in the more vital growing zones. Moreover, plans were implemented that launched the “green revolution” in Pakistan, and new hybrid wheat and rice varieties were introduced with the goal of increasing yields.

Despite positive economic developments, overall, most investment was directed toward West Pakistan, and the divisions between East and West grew during this period. Ayub Khan attempted to answer Bengali fears of becoming second-class citizens when—after work was begun, at his order, on building a new Pakistan capital at Islamabad—he declared it was his intention to build a second, or legislative, capital near Dhaka, in East Pakistan. However, the start of construction on the new second capital did not placate the Bengalis, who were angered by Ayub Khan’s abrogation of the 1956 constitution, his failure to hold national elections, and the decision to sustain martial law.

East Pakistanis had many grievances, and in no instance did they genuinely believe their purposes and concerns could be served under Ayub Khan’s military government. Subsequent developments only served to enforce these beliefs. Water rights agreements signed with India and hydroelectric projects along the Indus River benefited the West, as did military agreements reached with the United States. The Pakistani officer class was largely from West Pakistan, and all the key army and air installations were located there—even in the case of naval capability, Karachi was a far more formidable base of operations than Chittagong in East Pakistan.

In 1962 Ayub Khan promulgated another constitution. Presidential rather than parliamentary in focus, it was based on an indirectly elected president and a reinforced centralized political system that emphasized the country’s viceregal tradition. Although Ayub anticipated launching the new political system without political parties, once the National Assembly was convened and martial law was lifted, it was apparent that political parties would be reactivated. Ayub therefore formed his own party, the Convention Muslim League, but the country’s political life and its troubles were little different from the days before martial law.

Ayub Khan won another formal term as president of Pakistan in January 1965, albeit in an election in which only the Basic Democrats cast ballots. Opposed by Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who ran on a Combined Opposition Parties ticket, the contest was closer than expected. During the election campaign, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—who as foreign minister was supposedly a loyal member of the Ayub Khan cabinet—promised in a public address that the conflict over Kashmir would be resolved during Ayub Khan’s presidency. Bhutto indicated that Kashmir would be released from Indian occupation by negotiation or, if that failed, by armed force, but there was little indication that Ayub Khan had sanctioned Bhutto’s pronouncement. Nevertheless, the foreign minister’s speech appeared to be both solace to the pro-Kashmiri interests in West Pakistan and a green light to the Pakistan army to begin making plans for a campaign in the disputed region.

A new war over Kashmir was not long in coming. Skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani forces on the line of control between the two administrated portions of the region increased in the summer of 1965, and by September major hostilities had erupted between the two neighbours. Indian strategy confounded Pakistani plans, as New Delhi ordered its forces to strike all along the border between India and West Pakistan and to launch air raids against East Pakistan and even threaten to invade the East. Pakistan’s military stores soon were exhausted, a situation made worse by an American-imposed arms embargo on both states that affected Pakistan much more than India. Ayub Khan had to consider halting the hostilities.

Ultimately, Ayub Khan was forced to accept a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire and to give up Pakistan’s quest for resolving the Kashmir problem by force of arms. Embarrassed and humiliated, Ayub Khan saw all his efforts at building a new Pakistan dashed in one failed venture, and he was compelled to attend a peace conference with the Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in Tashkent, in Soviet Uzbekistan. There the two leaders were unable to reach a satisfactory agreement of their own making, and their hosts compelled them to sign a draft prepared for them. At that juncture, Bhutto, who had accompanied Ayub Khan to the conference, indicated a desire to separate himself from his mentor. Ayub Khan’s popularity had reached its lowest level, and, in the Pakistani game of zero-sum politics, Bhutto anticipated gaining what the president had lost. Pressed by Ayub Khan, Bhutto held up his resignation, but soon thereafter he broke with the president, joined his voice to the opposition, and in due course organized his own political party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

Ayub Khan was never the same after signing the Tashkent Agreement. Confronted by rising opposition that was now led by Bhutto in West Pakistan and Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan, Ayub Khan struck back by arresting both men. Acknowledging that he could not manage the country without a modicum of cooperation from the politicians, Ayub Khan summoned a conference of opposition leaders and withdrew the state of emergency under which Pakistan had been governed since 1965. These concessions, however, failed to conciliate the opposition, and in February 1969 Ayub announced that he would not contest the presidential election scheduled for 1970. In the meantime, protests mounted in the streets, and strikes paralyzed the economy. Sparked by grievances that could not be contained, especially in East Pakistan, the disorder spread to the western province, and all attempts to restore tranquility proved futile. One theme sustained the demonstrators: Ayub Khan had remained in power too long, and it was time for him to go.

In March 1969, Ayub Khan announced his retirement and named Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan to succeed him as president. Once again the country was placed under martial law. Yahya Khan, like Ayub Khan before him, assumed the role of chief martial-law administrator. In accepting the responsibility for leading the country, Yahya Khan said he would govern Pakistan only until the national election in 1970. Yahya Khan abolished Ayub Khan’s basic democracies system and abrogated the 1962 constitution. He also issued a Legal Framework Order (LFO) that broke up the single unit of West Pakistan and reconstituted the original four provinces of Pakistan—i.e., Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province, and Balochistan. The 1970 election therefore was not only meant to restore parliamentary government to the country, it was also intended to reestablish the provincial political systems. The major dilemma in the LFO, however, was that in breaking up the one-unit system, the distribution of seats in the National Assembly would be apportioned among the provinces on the basis of population. This meant that East Pakistan, with its larger population, would be allotted more seats than all the provinces of West Pakistan combined.

From disunion through the Zia al-Huq era

Civil war

Pakistan’s first national election therefore proved to be no panacea. After campaigning on autonomy for East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won almost every seat in the National Assembly that had been allotted to the east wing under the LFO. Sheikh Mujib, as he was popularly known, now was the paramount leader in East Pakistan, and, because his party had won a majority of the 300 contested seats in the National Assembly, Mujib was entitled to form the national government. However, Bhutto—whose PPP had won a commanding majority in West Pakistan—and the military establishment refused a government where the country’s future might be unilaterally decided by the East. Arguing that Mujib did not have a single seat in the western provinces and that he, Bhutto, was the only serious representative from the west wing, Bhutto insisted on using another formula to organize the civilian government.

Yahya Khan was called to mediate between Mujib and Bhutto, and in the meantime their respective parties addressed the dilemma and sought still another avenue that might produce a compromise solution. Mujib, having been elected on the promise of pursuing autonomy in East Pakistan, was unwilling to compromise on his six-point program for the East to enjoy increased self-governance. Bhutto and his associates, meanwhile, saw the program as an end to federation altogether. Bhutto convinced Khan to postpone the convening of the National Assembly as the two sides worked to find a solution, and Khan did so on March 1, 1971.

Mujib declared that the people of Bengal had once again been betrayed by the power in West Pakistan. Provoked by the more radical elements in the Awami League and swept along by street demonstrations, strikes, and violent protests, he called for a boycott and general strike throughout East Pakistan. Mayhem ensued, as Bengalis attacked members of the non-Bengali community, particularly the Biharis (refugees from India and their descendants), resulting in considerable loss of life. In mid-March Khan and Bhutto again flew to Dhaka and pursued negotiations once more. At the same time, the army was being prepared for a campaign to neutralize a budding rebellion and save the unity of Pakistan.

The army struck against the Awami League and its supporters on the night of March 25, 1971. Mujib was arrested and flown secretly to a prison in West Pakistan. Other major members of the party were likewise apprehended or went into hiding. Dhaka University was fired upon, and a large number of Bengali students and intellectuals were taken into custody; scores were transported to a remote location outside the city and summarily executed. Bengali armed resistance, which came to be called the Mukhti Bhini (“Freedom Force”), took form from disaffected Bengalis in the Pakistan army and others who were prepared to fight what they now judged to be an alien army. The independent state of Bangladesh was proclaimed, and a government in exile took root in India just across the East Pakistani border.

The escalation of violence provoked a mass movement of people, the majority of whom sought refuge in India. Although this heavy influx of refugees included a good portion of the Hindus who had remained in East Bengal after partition, many were Muslims. In fact, although the Pakistan army argued that Hindus from both portions of Bengal were responsible for the intensity of the struggle, there was no mistaking the great number of Muslim Bengalis who were being assaulted. The Pakistan army was unable to quell the fighting, and Indian forces began to supply the Mukhti Bhini. In December 1971 the Indian army invaded East Pakistan and in a few days forced the surrender of the 93,000-man West Pakistani garrison there.

Unable to supply its forces in the East, Pakistan opted not to expand the war in the West. The United States stood with Pakistan in the debate in the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, the U.S. government made no serious attempt to intervene and noted that its alliances with Pakistan did not commit Americans to take sides in a civil war, even one internationalized by the Indian invasion of East Pakistan. It was clear that India had effectively and irreversibly dismembered Pakistan and that the Muslim country would now take a different form from the one created by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Forced to yield his authority by the junta that had earlier sustained him, Yahya Khan resigned the presidency on December 20, 1971; unlike his predecessor, Ayub Khan, he was in no position to pass the office to still another general. The Pakistan army had suffered a severe blow, and for the time the military was content to retire from politics and rebuild its forces and reputation. Bhutto, the leading politician in what remained of Pakistan, assumed the presidency and was called to assemble a new government. Under pressure to restore equilibrium, Bhutto pledged a new Pakistan, a new constitution, and a new public order, and he articulated a vision for Pakistan that rallied diverse elements and seemed to promise a new life for the country. But the joining together of hands did not last long. Bhutto’s manner, posture, and performance were more of the aristocrat than of the “Leader of the People” (Quaid-e Awam), a title he assumed for himself. In 1973 a new constitution, crafted by Bhutto and his colleagues, was adopted that restored parliamentary government. Bhutto stepped down from the presidency, which he deemed ceremonial in the new constitutional system, and assumed the more dynamic premiership.

As prime minister, Bhutto demanded nothing less than absolute power, and, increasingly suspicious of those around him, he formed the Federal Security Force (FSF), the principal task of which was his personal protection. In time, the FSF emerged as a paramilitary organization, and Bhutto’s demand for ever-increasing personal security raised questions about his governing style. It also opened rifts in the PPP, and it was not long before the suspicious Bhutto ordered the silencing and imprisonment of his closest associates. The younger generation, which had idolized Bhutto during his rise to power, also became the target of police and FSF crackdowns, which often paralyzed operations at the universities. Though Bhutto had presided over the promulgation of the 1973 constitution, too much had transpired—and much more unpleasantness lay ahead—to conclude that the new political order could save Pakistan from repeating past mistakes.

Bhutto scheduled the country’s second national election in 1977. With the PPP being the only successful national party in the country, nine opposition parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and agreed to run as a single bloc. Fearing the possible strength of the PNA, Bhutto and his colleagues plotted an electoral strategy that included unleashing the FSF to terrorize the opposition. However, PNA members refused to be intimidated and centred their attacks on Bhutto and the PPP by running on a particularly religious platform. Arguing that Bhutto had betrayed Islamic practices, the PNA called for a cleansing of the body politic and a return to the basic tenets of Islamic performance.

The PNA, despite their efforts, was soundly defeated in the election, but the polling had not been without incident. Almost immediately complaints arose of electoral fraud, and voter discontent soon degenerated into violent street demonstrations. Bhutto and his party had won by a landslide, but it turned out to be an empty victory. With riots erupting in all the major metropolitan areas, the army, increasingly disenchanted with Bhutto, again intervened in Pakistan’s politics. Ignoring the election results, the army arrested Bhutto and dissolved his government. The prime minister was placed under house arrest, and, on July 5, 1977, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, Bhutto’s personal choice to head the Pakistan army, took the reins of government. Zia declared his intention to hold a new round of elections that would be fairer and more transparent. However, it soon became apparent that the army had no intention of allowing Bhutto to return to power. Bhutto’s subsequent arrest on charges that he ordered the assassination of a political rival, and Zia’s insistence that he be tried for this alleged crime, brought an end to the Bhutto era and ushered in the Zia ul-Haq regime.

Zia ul-Haq

Zia ul-Haq’s initial declaration that he would return government to civilian hands was at variance with his behaviour. His subsequent change in direction hinted that there were powers behind the scene that were determined to eliminate Bhutto as an active player. Zia in fact called for a complete change in direction once the decision was made not to conduct new elections, to arrest and try Bhutto, and, ultimately, to ignore the pleadings from the governments of other countries to spare Bhutto’s life. Found guilty and sentenced to death, Bhutto was hanged on April 4, 1979.

After Bhutto’s death, Zia ul-Haq, president since 1978, settled to the task of redesigning a political system for Pakistan. A devout Muslim, Zia believed that religious tradition should guide Pakistan’s institutions in all aspects of daily life. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Muslim Afghanistan in December 1979 reinforced Zia’s belief that only by drawing from Islamic practices could the Muslims inhabiting both Pakistan and Afghanistan find common ground in their struggle to withstand the assault from an alien and aggressive neighbour. Islamization therefore became the guiding principle in Zia’s plan to reform Pakistan, to reassure its unity, and to galvanize the country to meet all threats, both foreign and domestic. Clearly, the program of Islamization was also geared to reinforce the rule of Zia ul-Haq as well as establish his legitimacy.

Pakistan’s status as a “frontline state” after the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan demanded a military presence, and Zia ul-Haq played a major role in assisting the Afghan resistance (the mujahideen). The country also opened its doors to an influx of several million Afghan refugees, the majority of whom were housed in camps not far from the border. The main Afghan resistance leaders also established their headquarters in and around the northern city of Peshawar. However, Pakistan had limited resources with which to assist the refugees or the Afghan mujahideen, and assistance was sought from other Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia. After Ronald Reagan became president of the United States in 1981, Washington also answered the call for help. Pakistan soon became the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid, which by the end of Reagan’s second term had reached several billion dollars. Not insignificantly, Reagan also waived all trade restrictions on aid to Pakistan, even though Islamabad was known to be pursuing an aggressive program to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, despite strains in their relationship, Washington and Islamabad found common ground in the Soviet-Afghan conflict. Moreover, U.S. intelligence services did not discourage their Pakistani counterparts—most notably those in the Inter-Service Intelligence directorate—from working in close harmony with the most radical religious movements in Afghanistan.

The 1979 revolution in Iran, which ended the Pahlavi monarchy there, dovetailed with developments in Pakistan. Sensing an Islamic renaissance that would sweep the majority of Islamic nations, Zia ul-Haq had no hesitation in promoting a political system guided by religious principles and traditions. Zia called for criminal punishments in keeping with Islamic law. He also insisted upon banking practices and economic activity that followed Islamic experience. Zia put his Islamization program to a referendum of the people in 1984 and coupled it to a vote of confidence in his presidency, a favourable outcome of which would provide him with an additional five years in office. Zia indeed won overwhelming approval, though only half of the eligible voters participated, and the opposition insisted that the vote was rigged. Zia nevertheless had received his vote of confidence, and his Islamization program continued as the central policy of his administration.

In February 1985 Zia ul-Haq allowed national and provincial assembly elections, though without the participation of political parties. Zia’s opponents accused him of dictatorial tactics and asserted that the general-cum-president was only interested in neutralizing his opposition. Zia’s Islamic system, they argued, was little more than a ploy aimed at acquiring still wider powers. Although the opposition called on voters to boycott the elections, it was largely ignored, and the people turned out in considerable numbers to elect new legislatures and thereby end still another extended period of martial law. Zia ul-Haq used the occasion of the convening of the national assembly to handpick Muhammad Khan Junejo, a Sindhi politician and landowner, to become the country’s new prime minister.

Martial law was officially lifted in December 1985, and political parties sought to take advantage of the new conditions by reestablishing themselves. In January 1986, Junejo announced that he intended to revive and lead the Pakistan Muslim League—often designated as Muslim League (J) to distinguish it from other factions attempting to access the party’s legacy. Soon afterward Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and head of the PPP, returned from a two-year exile abroad and was greeted by a tumultuous gathering of supporters who were eager to reclaim their party’s reputation. Other political parties also reemerged during this period, but it was clear that in the contest for national political power the key rivals would be the Muslim League (J) and Bhutto’s PPP.

Lifting martial law coincided with intensified conflict between the country’s different ethnic communities, particularly in the commercial port city of Karachi. Tension between native Sindhis and Muslim immigrants from India (muhajirs) was an ever-present dilemma, and the formation of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in the mid-1980s was both a cause and a consequence of the violence that was directed against the immigrant community. The founding of the MQM and its increasingly militant posture aroused the native Sindhis as never before. The Sindhi complaint that the muhajirs enjoyed a monopoly of political and economic power in Karachi did not go unnoticed. Indeed, the violent clashes between Sindhis and muhajirs were an inevitable outcome of the failure to promote civil society, let alone to encourage deeper integration among Pakistan’s ethnic groups. Moreover, violence could not be avoided when Pashtun migrants, notably Afghan Pashtuns, began moving from the frontier region to Karachi, posing still another challenge to the Sindhi as well as muhajir communities.

Still another problem involved the narcotics and weapons trade that had its roots in the North-West Frontier Province. By 1986 intercommunal violence in Karachi had reached a level not seen since partition, nor was the fighting contained to Karachi. Riots also broke out in Quetta and Hyderabad, and the government called on the army to restore law and order.

Confronting major opposition to his rule, challenged by intensified ethnic warfare, and struggling to sustain an economy confounded by mixed signals, in May 1988 Zia ul-Haq dissolved the national and provincial assemblies and dismissed the Junejo government. The president alleged that Junejo’s administration reeked of corruption, that the prime minister was too weak to control profligate politicians, and that he had encouraged the political opposition to weaken Zia by undermining his administration. Zia promised the country still another national election, which would, he said, restore clean government, and in June he made himself head of a new caretaker government. Although the country was in considerable disarray, Zia pretended that everything was under control. On August 17, 1988, he was killed when his aircraft blew up in flight from Bahawalpur; the cause of the crash, which also took the life of the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and several top-ranking Pakistani generals, has never been fully determined.

Political and social fragmentation

The first administration of Benazir Bhutto

Following Zia’s death and under the prevailing law of succession, the chairman of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a longtime civil servant, became acting president. His first official act was to declare that the elections scheduled for November 1988 would be held as planned. The election results revealed that Benazir Bhutto’s PPP had won somewhat less than half the seats in the legislature. One-fourth went to the Islamic Democratic Alliance (which claimed to represent the policies of the late general), and the remaining seats were won by independents and candidates from a number of lesser parties. Bhutto’s party did well in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province, where it was able to form the provincial governments. However, the Punjab was won by the Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Itihad [IJI]), led by Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi businessman, who became the province’s chief minister.

Bhutto and her PPP had failed to win a mandate from the voters; however, the party had more seats in the national assembly than its nearest rival, and Ishaq Khan chose Bhutto to organize Pakistan’s first civilian administration since the dissolution of her father’s government in 1977. Thus, Ishaq Khan was formally elected president in December, and Benazir Bhutto became Pakistan’s first female prime minister. Moreover, she was the first woman to head a Muslim state.

The new prime minister was in one respect fortunate. Soon after she came to power, the Soviet Union withdrew the last of its forces from Afghanistan. On the other hand, an Afghan communist regime was still in power, and more than three million Afghan refugees remained in Pakistan. In an effort to sustain good relations with the army, which remained deeply committed to a presence in Afghanistan, Bhutto allowed the Pakistani military (now under the command of Gen. Mirza Aslam Baig) to sustain its proxy fight against the communist regime in Kabul. She also was compelled to use the military in a law-and-order campaign in Karachi, where ethnic unrest had continued unabated. Denied success in either operation, Bhutto began to challenge army strategy on the one side and simultaneously lost favour with the attentive Pakistani public on the other. Moreover, with developments in Sind unresolved, Bhutto aggravated the base of her supporters there.

Instead of acknowledging the need to form a coalition government with the IJI, Bhutto tried to force Nawaz Sharif to yield his position as chief minister of the Punjab. Sharif fought back, and Bhutto was confronted with more foes than she could manage. Unable to pass essential legislation, the Bhutto government faced charges of ineptitude and corruption, and demands for her removal were heard throughout the country. In August 1990 President Ishaq Khan could no longer ignore the situation and ruled that the PPP administration had lost the trust of the people. The Bhutto administration was dismissed, and another round of elections was scheduled for October. The PPP lost the contest, with Bhutto arguing that the elections had been rigged against her.

Bhutto was succeeded as prime minister by her Punjabi nemesis, Nawaz Sharif, but it was Ishaq Khan who had wielded extraordinary powers under the amended 1973 constitution (originally pressed by Zia ul-Haq to legitimize his authority). Thus, the viceregal tradition remained the dynamic force in Pakistani politics. Moreover, Bhutto’s earlier dismissal of Lieut. Gen. Hamid Gul—the powerful head of Inter-Service Intelligence and a close associate of President Ishaq Khan—suggested that there was much behind-the-scenes maneuvering that forced the president to act. Therefore, although the election had denied Bhutto’s return to the prime minister’s office, it was the prevailing view that the upper echelon of the Pakistani army had had enough of Bhutto.

The first administration of Nawaz Sharif

Nawaz Sharif rode to power on a wave of anti-PPP sentiment that included that of many disenchanted PPP members. The IJI, whose central core was the revived Punjab Muslim League, now reached out to the parties dominating the politics of the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. Moreover, Sharif adopted Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization program as his own, bolstered alliances with the religious parties, and succeeded in getting the National Assembly to approve the Shariat Bill, with its special references to the Qurʾān and Sharīʿah as the law of the land. Like Zia before him, Sharif was able to enlist the support of the Muslim orthodoxy and made its allegiance a central tenet of his rule. But while Sharif was prepared to honour the more devout members of the religious community, he could not ignore his dependency on Pakistanis in the commercial and banking world. In the end, the prime minister could not meet the expectations of his different constituencies, and his coalition crumbled. Sustained civil disobedience, acts of lawlessness, and failed economic policies produced dissatisfaction.

Despite the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul in 1992, conditions in Afghanistan remained unstable, and the Pakistani military sought to restore order by supporting an ultraconservative religious regime—soon known as the Taliban—that came to dominate most of strife-torn Afghanistan. Relations between the prime minister, president, and army remained problematic. Nawaz Sharif had replaced army chief of staff Baig with Gen. Asif Nawaz in 1991; but when Asif Nawaz died suddenly and somewhat mysteriously two years later, Ishaq Khan took it upon himself to appoint Lieut. Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakar his successor, without consulting the prime minister. A struggle ensued between Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan, with Sharif arguing the need to eliminate the viceregal powers of the president.

In April 1993, before Sharif could act, Ishaq Khan struck back. Using his constitutional powers, the president dismissed the Sharif government and again dissolved the national assembly. Sharif appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming the president had acted arbitrarily and contrary to constitutional principle. The court unexpectedly agreed with Sharif’s petition and ruled that the prime minister should be reinstated. Challenged by the unprecedented court action and acknowledging that both Sharif and Ishaq Khan had lost their credibility, the army again intervened and convinced both men that it would be in the country’s interest for them to resign their respective offices in July. With both the presidency and the prime minister’s office vacant, it was the army that ensured a smooth transition to still another caretaker government. Senate chairman Wasim Sajjad assumed the office of president, and Moeen Qureshi, a former World Bank official living in New York City, agreed to act as interim prime minister.

The interim government

The Moeen Qureshi administration proved to be a unique experience in the history of Pakistan. With full support from the country’s armed forces, the interim prime minister moved quickly to implement reforms that included devaluing the Pakistan rupee (the national currency), exposing corrupt practices in and outside government, and demanding that monies owed the government be paid forthwith. Qureshi cracked down on the granting of public land to politicians, on the failure to pay utility bills, and on loan defaulters, who were estimated in the thousands. Insisting on austerity measures and demanding that the country learn to live within its means, his administration was a breath of fresh air in an environment known for profligacy and inefficiency. The prime minister struck a blow against the landed gentry by imposing a temporary levy on agriculture, and he made no secret of his intention to strike at the big absentee landlords and their carefully hidden sources of wealth.

Qureshi’s tactics brought new funds into the Pakistan treasury, but even then they were hardly enough to return the country to solvency. Nevertheless, he persisted, even moving against the drug lords and demanding police reform so that law enforcement could more effectively deal with a deepening national problem of narcotics addiction. However, Qureshi’s reforms also produced problems and a stable of critics. The devaluation of the rupee and the restrictions imposed on the country’s commercial life elevated the price of gasoline, natural gas, and electricity, as well as staple food commodities. Generally speaking, though, the criticism leveled against the interim prime minister’s policies emanated from the sidelined politicians who suddenly posed themselves as benefactors of the country’s poorer classes.

The second administration of Benazir Bhutto

National elections were held again in October 1993. In a close contest, the PPP won a plurality—though not a majority—of seats in the National Assembly; Nawaz Sharif’s new Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N) was a somewhat distant second, though his party received a slightly higher percentage of the popular vote. Fewer than half of registered voters cast a ballot, and election results were close throughout the country. Overall, however, Balochistan was the only province where the PPP failed to outdistance the PML-N. In alliance with Junejo’s Pakistan Muslim League (J) (PML-J), the PPP formed the new civilian government, and, after three years in the opposition, Benazir Bhutto returned to the premiership.

The PML-J helped the PPP take control of the Punjab, an objective that Bhutto could not attain in her earlier administration. Nonetheless, Nawaz Sharif’s party was able to form coalition provincial governments in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province. The power, however, was in Bhutto’s hands, and it was for her to determine the country’s course. Having spoken of democracy for so long, it was the prime minister’s task to realize what had escaped her grasp during her previous administration. Moreover, Bhutto had the good fortune of having one of her own party, Farooq Leghari, assume the office of the president. Yet, the country remained economically unstable, and Pakistanis were far from developing a genuine civil society. Bhutto, favoured by the Americans, had to juggle relations with them and the Pakistani people: Pakistan came under U.S. pressure to freeze Pakistan’s popular nuclear program and to reach a settlement over Kashmir. Furthermore, in 1993, the United States (at New Delhi’s urging) had placed Pakistan on a “watch list” as a state sponsor of terrorism. India cited Islamabad’s support of jihadi movements operating in Kashmir, but the Pakistani public, as well as Pakistan’s military establishment, had long encouraged and supported the development of a variety of resistance groups in what they had always termed “occupied Kashmir.” The U.S. pressure therefore was judged offensive and denounced by the Pakistanis.

Political crises both major and minor abounded, and Bhutto faced the added indignity of having a major family squabble spill over into the media when the prime minister’s brother Murtaza Bhutto accused her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, of corruption. The incident soon spun out of control, with Bhutto’s mother taking Murtaza’s side. The prime minister was able to do little to push her legislative agenda, and Nawaz Sharif released documents that cited Bhutto’s personal excesses; when the prime minister herself became embroiled in a banking scandal, it was almost impossible for her to mount a credible defense. President Leghari himself could not escape criticism, and it was alleged that he profited from a land deal that was linked to his PPP associations.

Bhutto, like Sharif earlier, had become bogged down responding to accusations of corruption and extortion, while the government foundered. Nationwide, chaos reigned. In Sind, another round of sectarian fighting erupted, and strife between Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims contributed to the mayhem. In the North-West Frontier Province tribal leaders had become the target of assassins, while others were implicated in trafficking weapons and drugs. The army earlier had pledged a hands-off policy in political matters, but domestic conditions had so deteriorated that that promise had to be reconsidered. Moreover, in October 1995 some 40 army officers were arrested for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government and kill the president and prime minister.

Given the intensifying woes, Bhutto no longer saw eye to eye with President Leghari, and when he ignored her advice in dealing with the army high command and with changes in the Supreme Court, their relationship reached the breaking point. Leghari, uncomfortable with the constant intrigue, was ready to take direct action against Bhutto and her husband. That moment came in September 1996, when Benazir’s brother Murtaza Bhutto was killed in a police shootout, and Asif Ali Zardari was accused of complicity in Murtaza’s death. In November, Leghari dismissed Bhutto’s government.

The Meraj Khalid interim government was meant to keep the country on the rails, not to correct Pakistan’s multidimensional problems. Bureaucrats were purged for compromising their professionalism by colluding with the PPP, the national economy underwent scrutiny by expert economists, and a serious effort was made to restore law and order. In the meantime, the politicians clamoured for a return to more-formal civilian politics. Bhutto was the most vociferous, having accused Leghari of stabbing her in the back. Ignoring these assaults, the interim government began the process of establishing a Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS), comprising the president, the prime minister, the defense minister, the interior minister, and the chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although high-ranking military officers appeared favourably disposed to the formation of the CDNS, many politicians were wary and were reluctant to lend their support.

The second administration of Nawaz Sharif

Bhutto’s appeal to the Supreme Court that her government had been unconstitutionally dissolved was denied, and the 1997 elections, which went forward on schedule, were judged fair in spite of claims of fraud by the PPP. Of the more than 200 seats contested in the National Assembly, the PPP won fewer than 20. Only in Sind did the PPP have anything resembling a respectable showing. The PML-N of Nawaz Sharif was the big winner, taking all the provinces either outright or through coalitions with provincial parties. Although only one-third of the eligible electorate had voted, no party in the history of Pakistan had done better in an election (taking two-thirds of the vote), and Sharif could claim a veritable mandate. With the armed forces standing by, and with the president still armed with extraordinary powers, Sharif assembled another government.

Mindful of the need to limit the power of the president, Nawaz Sharif gained parliamentary approval of the 13th amendment to the constitution, which withdrew the president’s authority to remove a government at his own discretion. A 14th amendment, which prevented party members from violating party discipline, was struck down by the Supreme Court, an action that set the stage for a confrontation between the prime minister and the high court. Sharif attempted to have the number of Supreme Court members reduced from 17 to 12. However, this attempt to tamper with the judiciary stirred up the Pakistani bar, which entered the fray and demanded that Sharif be disqualified as a member of the parliament. Although the prime minister relented, by December 1997 Sharif, with assistance from the parliament, had extended his powers to such a degree that even President Leghari was forced to resign. Sharif also accrued enough power to relieve the chief justice of the Supreme Court of his duties.

Continuing challenges: conflict, a stalled economy, and nuclear tests

Nevertheless, Nawaz Sharif’s successful power plays were minimized by his failure to halt the sustained ethnic conflict in Karachi and Sind, the sectarian bloodshed that had broken out in the North-West Frontier Province, and the tribal struggle for greater autonomy in Balochistan. All of these conflicts had escalated throughout his time in office. Moreover, the government could arrest radicals and others accused of perpetuating the general disorder, but it could not bring an end to civil strife—and it certainly could not act without the services provided by the army.

Sharif also had to confront an economy in shambles, and serious consideration was given to selling public assets (e.g., power stations, telecommunications, airlines, banks, and railroads) to meet obligations on the ever-growing foreign debt. Indeed, Sharif’s interest in a form of “supply side” economic reorganization and privatization was not the sought-after remedy.

Despite these failures, however, by 1998 Nawaz Sharif had amassed more power than any previous elected civilian government in Pakistan. The country was a long way from achieving real growth, however, and the continuing reluctance to allow for a loyal opposition made a mockery of the regime’s democratic goals. The PML-N leader used his influence to implement “Program 2010,” which centred attention on education reform, the launching of public service committees, and the opening of new employment opportunities. However, the prime minister’s economic program came to nothing when the countries that had been expected to provide the funding for the different ventures withdrew their offers after Pakistan detonated a series of nuclear devices in May 1998.

News of the nuclear tests sent distress signals throughout the world, and concerns only intensified with Pakistan’s growing instability and the likelihood that nuclear weapons, technology, or materials could be transferred, sold, or leaked to other countries or groups (indeed, in 2004 Abdal Qadir Khan, the head of Pakistan’s nuclear program, admitted to sharing weapons technology with several countries, including Iran, North Korea, and Libya). In the final analysis, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons did little to address the social and political unrest in the country, and it was hardly a boon to the national economy or to Sharif’s political future.

Growing unrest, tension with the military, and Sharif’s ouster

Confronted with growing unrest, much of it directed against his rule, Sharif proclaimed a state of emergency, which enabled him to rule the country by ordinance and special decrees. He also made closer alliances with the orthodox Islamic groups (e.g., the Islamic Assembly) and seemed to placate the religious divines by adopting additional Islamic laws (e.g., its punishment for adultery). A proposed 15th amendment to the constitution, establishing Islamic law as the basis of all governance, was never fully ratified, but Pakistan’s Federal Shariat Court, instituted during the Zia years, was given greater latitude in meting out Islamic justice.

The prime minister’s autocratic behaviour only intensified local and provincial resistance. The PPP and a number of smaller parties formed the Pakistan Awami Itehad, but it was not clear how they expected to challenge the administration. Moreover, the government had muzzled the press and ignored virtually all constitutional constraints, and administration expenditures had gone unchecked, as profligate spending on the regime’s pet projects caused more severe economic dislocation. With ethnic strife continuing unabated, Pakistan’s army chief of staff, Gen. Jehangir Karamat, spoke for a frustrated public when he appeared to indicate the country was teetering at the abyss. However, Karamat’s role in the political process angered Nawaz Sharif, and in October 1998 the prime minister pressured the army high command into forcing the general’s early retirement. Karamat was quickly and quietly replaced by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, a muhajir (post-partition immigrant) whom Sharif believed would be more compliant as well as apolitical.

Military leaders were now even more convinced that Sharif was attempting to politicize the army, but the army also had other concerns. In mid-1999 the conflict over the Kashmir region flared again, when fighting broke out with Indian forces in the high mountains of the Kargil region. The prime minister, sensing danger, made a hurried trip to Washington and appeared to yield to U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton’s suggestion that Pakistani forces pull back from the contested area. However, Pakistan’s generals opposed a retreat strategy, believing that the advantages favoured their forces. Most important, General Musharraf vehemently defended and stood with his fellow officers, and the impression circulated that the generals were planning to challenge Sharif’s powers. Sharif, only now realizing he had made the wrong choice to head the army, set in motion a plan to replace Musharraf with another general. Musharraf, however, had the support of his fellow officers and, unlike Karamat, had no intention of yielding his position.

On October 12, 1999, Sharif attempted to oust Musharraf while the general was out of the country, but other generals thwarted the plot and arrested Sharif. On his return to Pakistan that same day, Musharraf announced the dissolution of the Sharif government and the suspension of the constitution. Although the action was clearly a coup d’état, Musharraf did not declare martial law, and he stated that fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution were to be preserved and that all laws other than the constitution would continue in force unless altered by military authority. Musharraf nevertheless did declare a Proclamation of Emergency, and on October 14 he announced that Pres. Mohammad Rafique Tarar would remain in office, while the national and state legislatures would be suspended. The country’s courts would continue operating with the limitation that the justices not interfere with any order coming from the chief executive—as Musharraf at first styled himself. Moreover, Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999 specified that the president could only act in accordance with and with the advice of the chief executive.

The Pervez Musharraf government

As chief executive, Musharraf arrogated virtual total power to himself. The general cited the substantial turmoil in the country and noted that institutions had been systematically destroyed, that the economy was in a state of near collapse, and that only the most drastic measures could even begin to improve the national condition. Musharraf said Pakistan was at a critical crossroads and that the Sharif government had even planned to split and weaken the armed forces. Noting that he could not save both the country and the constitution at the same time, Musharraf chose to sacrifice the latter for the former. Nonetheless, the constitution had not been abrogated—merely held in “abeyance” until better times again allowed for its reinstatement. Careful to point out that martial law had not been imposed, he nevertheless insisted the country could not afford to perpetuate the old politics.

A Chief Executive Secretariat was hurriedly assembled in the waning days of 1999, and by mid-2000 that temporary edifice had undergone restructuring in order to give more administrative powers to the new regime. Ranking military officers assumed the most important positions in the government, and all civilian members of the secretariat had to pass scrutiny by army officers. The massive induction of serving military officers in the secretariat also was aimed at providing Musharraf with the same command and discipline structure found in the Pakistan army. The major dilemma facing Pakistan’s new rulers, however, was their lack of experience in civil affairs. Moreover, on-the-job training in the day-to-day life of the country quickly caused strains within the services.

Nawaz Sharif was arrested, charged and tried for high crimes, and, after being found guilty, sentenced to a long prison term. However, under international pressure he subsequently was released and sent into exile (Saudi Arabia), with the understanding that he would remain out of the country for 10 years.

Relations with the United States, consolidation of Musharraf’s rule, and meetings with India

The actions of Pakistan’s generals were coldly received by many in the outside world. Washington was quick to criticize the coup leaders, and Clinton signaled his disfavour by altering his March 2000 South Asian itinerary so as to spend only a few hours in Pakistan while stopping in India and Bangladesh for longer visits. However, the strain in U.S.-Pakistan relations was caused by a wide array of issues: Pakistan’s sustained political instability, its repeated failure at constructing civil society, the impediments to a resolution of the Kashmir question, and—most significantly—what seemed to be the country’s nuclear arms race with India.

As was the case in previous military governments, Musharraf’s announced intent was to return Pakistan to civilian rule as soon as feasible. The chief executive’s plan to achieve this goal was similar in certain aspects to that put forward by Ayub Khan a generation earlier. Civilian rule had fragmented, and a return to full civilian control would first require the establishment of local democracy—hearkening back to Ayub Khan’s “basic democracies”—a system devoid of competitive political parties. However, like the generals before him, Musharraf chose in June 2001 to consolidate his power by forcing the retirement of President Rafique Tarar, dispensing with the title of chief executive, and making himself president. The general also effectively became head of government, since the position of prime minister had been vacant since Sharif’s ouster.

In July, as president, Musharraf traveled to Agra, India, where he met with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to discuss regional security and, importantly, the status of Kashmir. No real progress was made, but the meeting set the stage for subsequent summit meetings between Musharraf and his Indian counterparts. The president appeared to be slipping into a role that promised a period of reflection on how to reconstruct the country’s domestic and foreign policy, but that all was changed within two months by the new reality created by the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Hesitant rejection of Islamist militants

Following Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in (and loss of) East Pakistan and Zia ul-Huq’s subsequent emphasis on Islamization, the Pakistani army increasingly had been inclined to define its purpose in spiritual terms. Musharraf, long a key planner in Pakistan’s military hierarchy, was linked to these trends. Initially, this constituted recruiting Islamist militants for clandestine operations in the Kashmir region. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan—particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA; now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) along the Afghan border—became a safe haven for such militants from all parts of the world. The Pakistani military’s Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI) became the main conduit of the country’s support of the Afghan mujahideen fighters based there in their conflict with the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Such assistance continued following the withdrawal of Moscow’s forces in the late 1980s, and the ISI was instrumental in raising the Taliban as a counterforce to the rival groups seeking control of the Afghan state at that time—the strategy being to give Pakistan a dominant role in Afghanistan as that country emerged from two decades of constant warfare.

Pakistan’s political landscape changed dramatically with the events of September 11. It was quickly determined that the attacks on the United States had been staged by the Muslim militant organization al-Qaeda, which was operating out of Afghanistan near the Pakistani border with the support of the Taliban regime. Pakistan had diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, but Musharraf hesitated to put pressure on the Taliban to arrest al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. However, as al-Qaeda and the Taliban became judged a single entity, the United States demanded Pakistani assistance as it prepared to move militarily against both organizations. Musharraf chose to side with the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban.

Musharraf’s decision to join the American effort was met with outrage by Islamist conservatives in Pakistan. Thousands of pro-Taliban Pakistani volunteers crossed the border to help in the fight against U.S. troops and their coalition allies when those forces invaded and occupied Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. In the period following the September 11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the population of Islamist militants boomed in the FATA, as Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters found refuge over the border in Pakistan. Many more Muslim recruits flocked to the FATA from abroad, eager to join the conflict.

Musharraf was pressured by Washington to take aggressive action against these Islamist operatives in the tribal areas, and the Pakistani military launched a major campaign to combat militants, particularly in mountainous Waziristan. However, the tribal Pashtun region historically had been off-limits to the central government, and Pakistan’s military action not only challenged Pashtun tribal autonomy there, but it also affected members of the Pashtun community not involved with the militants. When government forces were met with stiff resistance, the soldiers—often paramilitary and recruited from similar tribal orders—refused to fight or fought with little enthusiasm. Musharraf dismissed a number of army officers deemed sympathetic to the Taliban, and numerous foreign jihadists (including al-Qaeda militants) were arrested by Pakistani authorities and turned over to coalition officials, but the United States continued to accuse Islamabad (and particularly Musharraf) of not doing enough to contain the terrorist threat.

Reinstated constitution

In April 2002 Musharraf, seeking to formalize his position as the head of state, held and overwhelmingly won a referendum granting him an additional five years as president. The referendum also reinstated the constitution, though modified with provisions spelled out in a document called the Legal Framework Order (LFO). In addition to extending Musharraf’s term, the LFO expanded the president’s powers and increased the number of members of both houses of the legislature. Parliamentary elections followed in October under the limitations imposed by the LFO, and Musharraf’s adopted political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (PML-Q), took more of the seats in the National Assembly than any other contending party. The party subsequently forged a coalition government headed by PML-Q leader Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, a veteran politician and former Nawaz Sharif supporter. The opposition PPP polled next highest, but it was a coalition of religious parties known as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) that made the most notable showing—marking the first time a Pakistani religious organization had gained a significant voice in parliament. The MMA was vehemently opposed to Musharraf’s policy of confronting Islamist groups, and, after gaining a dominant political role in the North-West Frontier Province, the MMA openly questioned the army’s actions in Waziristan.

Musharraf’s government had been combating religious extremism at home, banning some of the more militant groups that had long been active in Pakistan and rounding up hundreds of religious activists. However, Musharraf generally had not addressed Islamist violence in Kashmir. Low-level fighting and skirmishing took place along the line of control there until late November 2003, when, unexpectedly, the Pakistani government declared a unilateral cease-fire and sought negotiations with New Delhi. The following month, two attempts were made on the president’s life. Acts of political and religious violence continued to escalate, particularly those between Sunni and Shiʿi factions. Late in December the parliament ratified most provisions of the LFO as the 17th amendment to the constitution, confirming Musharraf’s power to dismiss a prime minister, dissolve the National Assembly, and appoint chiefs of the armed forces and provincial governors.

In January 2004 Musharraf sought and received an unprecedented vote of confidence from a parliamentary electoral college. In August Shaukat Aziz, a former banker and minister of finance, took the premiership. Musharraf, however, clearly continued to hold the reins of power, and, despite repeated promises to return the country to full civilian authority, he announced at the end of the year that the country was too fragile for him to comply with his own deadlines. This applied also to the president’s refusal to step down as head of the armed forces, despite repeated demands by political opponents that he do so. On the other side of the political spectrum, Musharraf had to contend with constant attacks from the MMA, who accused him of seeking to secularize Pakistan. The country continued to be subject to increasing incidents of sectarian violence, including suicide bombings at mosques and other public places. Adding to this human-generated calamity, Pakistan suffered a devastating earthquake in October 2005 in the Kashmir region that killed tens of thousands of people and left hundreds of thousands homeless.

Electoral losses and resignation

In early 2007 Musharraf began seeking reelection to the presidency. However, because he remained head of the military, opposition parties and then the Pakistan Supreme Court objected on constitutional grounds. In March Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, which sparked a general strike of Pakistani lawyers and outbreaks of violent protest in various parts of the country; the Supreme Court overturned the dismissal in July, and Chaudhry was reinstated. In October an electoral college consisting of the parliament and four provincial legislatures voted to give Musharraf another five-year term, although opposition members refused to participate in the proceedings. After the Supreme Court delayed the pronouncement of this outcome (in order to review its constitutionality), Musharraf declared a state of emergency in early November. The constitution was once again suspended, members of the Supreme Court (including Chaudhry) were dismissed, and the activities of independent news media organizations were curtailed. Later in the month, the Supreme Court, reconstituted with Musharraf appointees, upheld his reelection; Musharraf subsequently resigned his military commission and was sworn into the presidency as a civilian.

In the fall of 2007 Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto—who had also been living in exile—were permitted to return to Pakistan, and each began campaigning for upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for early January 2008. At the end of December, however, Bhutto was assassinated at a political rally in Rawalpindi, an act that stunned Pakistanis and set off riots and rampages in different parts of the country. Musharraf, having only just lifted the state of emergency, had to again place the armed forces on special alert, and he was forced to postpone the election until mid-February.

Lawrence Ziring

The outcome of the voting was seen as a rejection of Musharraf and his rule; his PML-Q party finished a distant third behind the PPP (now led by Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto’s widower), which captured about one-third of the parliamentary seats up for election, and Sharif’s party, the PML-N, with about one-fourth of the seats. In March the PPP and PML-N formed a coalition government. Yousaf Raza Gilani, a prominent member of the PPP and a former National Assembly speaker, was elected prime minister.

Disagreements emerged within the governing coalition in the months following its formation, particularly regarding the reinstatement of the Supreme Court judges Musharraf had dismissed late the previous year, and these disputes threatened to destabilize the alliance. Nevertheless, in August 2008 the coalition moved to begin impeachment charges against Musharraf, citing grave constitutional violations; on August 18, faced with the impending proceedings, Musharraf resigned.

Pakistan under Zardari

Conflict within the coalition continued to escalate following Musharraf’s departure. In light of ongoing differences, including disputes over Musharraf’s successor, Sharif subsequently withdrew the PML-N from the governing coalition and indicated that his party would put forth its own candidate in the presidential elections announced for early September; however, neither the PML-N nor the PML-Q candidate won enough support to pose a challenge to Zardari, the PPP’s candidate, and on September 6, 2008, he was elected president.

Friction between Zardari and Sharif intensified in early 2009 when the Supreme Court voted to disqualify Sharif’s brother from his position as chief minister of the Punjab and to uphold a ban prohibiting Sharif himself from holding political office (the ban stemmed from his 2000 conviction for high crimes). Sharif alleged that the court’s rulings were politically motivated and backed by Zardari. In addition, the status of the Supreme Court judges dismissed under Musharraf who had yet to be reinstated—one of the issues that had undermined the Sharif-Zardari coalition—remained a major source of conflict between the two rivals. In March 2009 Sharif broke free of an attempt to place him under house arrest and headed toward the capital, where he planned to hold a rally advocating for the reinstatement of the judges. Faced with this prospect, the government agreed to reinstate Chief Justice Chaudhry and a number of other Supreme Court judges who had not yet been returned to their posts. The move was seen as a political victory for Sharif and a significant concession on the part of Zardari, who is thought to have opposed Chaudhry’s return because of the possibility that the amnesty Zardari had received under Musharraf might be overturned. Shortly thereafter, Sharif’s brother was also returned to his position, and the ruling that banned Sharif from holding office was lifted in May.

Lawrence ZiringThe Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

U.S. drone strikes, floods of 2010, and religious tensions

Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the political drama of 2008, there were also developments on the foreign relations front. That year the United States expanded its campaign of targeted killings by remotely piloted drones in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), a region known to be a haven for Pashtun militants waging a guerilla war against international forces and the Afghan government in Afghanistan. The drone strikes, which had begun in 2004 under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency with the silent approval of the Pakistani government, stirred up widespread public outrage in Pakistan as they increased in frequency and caused increasing numbers of civilian deaths and injuries. Although Pakistani leaders decried the strikes as violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty, there continued to be reports of the government’s secret cooperation. Later that year, limited trade between the Pakistani- and Indian-administered portions of Kashmir resumed. It was the first such commerce in more than 60 years and signaled improved relations between the two countries.

In the summer of 2010 Pakistan faced the most destructive floods in the country’s recorded history. Swollen by unusually heavy monsoon rains, the Indus River—which in a typical monsoon season can expand to more than half a mile (one kilometre) by the time it reaches the provinces of Punjab and Sindh—grew to some 15 times its normal breadth. By mid-August more than 1,500 Pakistanis had died as a result of the river’s extraordinary flooding, and, with some one-fourth of the country touched by the floods, many millions more were affected to various degrees. The humanitarian disaster caused by the flooding was marked by shortages of food and drinking water, the threat of waterborne disease, looting and violence, and the disruption of transportation and communications infrastructure. In a country so reliant upon its agriculture, the inundation—which submerged swaths of cropland and killed large populations of livestock—promised to have a lasting effect on the production of food and of raw materials such as cotton, which sustains the country’s export-heavy textile industry.

2010 flooding in Pakistan
Areas affected by flooding in Pakistan in 2010.
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Religious tensions reappeared in January 2011 with the assassination of the governor of Punjab province, Salman Taseer, by a member of his own security detail. Taseer, a member of the PPP and a political ally of Zardari, had been among the most vocal critics of Pakistan’s blasphemy law, which called for the death penalty if a defendant was convicted of defaming Islam or Muhammad. Although the law, which was established in the 1980s under Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization program, had not resulted in any executions for blasphemy, it had become a point of contention between religious conservatives and secular politicians. Taseer’s assassination, carried out by an elite police commando with a history of Islamic radicalism, raised fears that moderate politicians were vulnerable to intimidation by religious conservatives. The public reaction to the assassination further highlighted the divisions in Pakistani society; while the PPP and most other political parties condemned the attack, many religious leaders and organizations denounced Taseer as an apostate and praised his killer for defending Islam.

Osama bin Laden discovered and killed

On May 2, 2011, a U.S. military operation in Pakistan killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of the al-Qaeda network. The assault, carried out by a small team transported by helicopter, was launched after U.S. intelligence located bin Laden living in a walled compound in Abbottabad, a medium-sized city near Islamabad. Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad threatened to add new tension to the often-troubled security alliance between the United States and Pakistan. Pakistani officials had often denied claims that bin Laden was hiding out in Pakistan, possibly abetted by Islamic militants in the remote and rugged areas on the Afghan border. After bin Laden’s death, the news that he had in fact lived in a large compound in an affluent area near the Pakistan Military Academy, one of the country’s most prestigious military institutes, raised questions about how his presence could have escaped the notice of Pakistan’s security forces.

Defeat at the polls

Zardari and the PPP-led governing coalition entered legislative elections in May 2013 with low approval ratings because of widespread discontent over corruption and weak economic development. The main beneficiary was Nawaz Sharif, whose reputation as a businessman and economic reformer helped the PML-N win considerably more seats than its closest challengers, the PPP and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI; Pakistan Justice Movement) party, positioning Sharif for a third term as prime minister.

The third administration of Nawaz Sharif

Domestic and foreign policy

Sharif began his third term as prime minister as a popular reformer. The economy improved substantially, with higher growth rates, a stable rupee, and lower inflation. The country’s infrastructure, however, continued to face hurdles, with demand for electricity outpacing supply and resulting in frequent and widespread shortages. His foreign policy agenda was oriented toward liberalizing trade, including with Pakistan’s neighbours. To do so, he made overtures for peaceful relations with India and post-NATO Afghanistan and attempted to reach a peace settlement with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an Islamist insurgency operating in Pakistan and unaffiliated with the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Under Sharif, Pakistan saw significant investment from China as the flagship program of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). China lent Pakistan tens of billions of dollars in order to develop Pakistan’s infrastructure and build a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that would allow China access to cheaper, more efficient trade routes. One of the program’s grandest projects was the development of the Gwadar seaport and a highway connecting it to China’s Xinjiang province. However, with the development projects paid for through hefty loans from China that required employment of Chinese businesses, Pakistan’s debt ballooned.

Disqualification from office

Sharif’s foreign outreach agenda stepped on the toes of the military establishment and the opposition. When opposition protests in 2014 provided a premise for the military to oust Sharif with popular support, the military instead used the opportunity to pressure Sharif to defer to military generals on matters of foreign policy and defense.

The 2015 leak of confidential international financial documents known as the Panama Papers linked three of Sharif’s children to offshore companies that they had allegedly used to purchase real estate in London. Sharif and his children denied any wrongdoing, but a corruption probe was opened into the matter. In 2017 the Supreme Court disqualified Sharif from holding public office, forcing his resignation. He was replaced by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi as prime minister. Sharif’s brother Shehbaz Sharif was selected to lead the PML-N party in the next elections.

Arrest and party defeat

Sharif and his family went into exile, and in July 2018 he and his daughter Maryam Nawaz Sharif were convicted in absentia. They returned to Lahore on July 13 to serve their sentences, saying that they were giving themselves up for the people of Pakistan at a “critical juncture” ahead of the elections. They were arrested shortly after arriving.

When the elections were held in late July, Imran Khan’s PTI party outperformed the PML-N. To guarantee security in the highly contentious election, the military had stationed at least 350,000 troops at the polling stations, and the Election Commission had granted the military express judicial power at those polling stations. While Khan praised the elections as the fairest in Pakistan’s history, the PML-N and the other parties expressed concern that the military had interfered in the elections, especially after their poll observers were ordered to leave polling stations before votes were counted. Nonetheless, the PML-N conceded, allowing Khan to seek a coalition and become prime minister.

Imran Khan’s premiership

Under Khan, Pakistan saw significant developments in its foreign relations. Just weeks into his premiership, the United States decided to withhold $300 million in promised military aid, saying that the country had not done enough to fight terrorism. Relations improved, however, and the aid was restored the following year, after Pakistan made successful efforts to pressure the Taliban in Afghanistan into peace talks. Afghanistan’s central government initially thanked Pakistan for its efforts, but diplomatic relations soured after comments by Khan undermined the authority of the central government.

Tensions with India over Kashmir came to a head in February 2019, after a suicide bombing there resulted in the deaths of 40 Indian security personnel. When a militant group believed to operate illegally in Pakistan took credit for the attack, the Indian Air Force conducted air strikes in Pakistan for the first time in five decades. Though India claimed it had destroyed a large training camp belonging to the militant group, Pakistan denied that any such camp had existed and said that India had struck an empty field instead. The next day Pakistan shot down two fighter jets from India and captured a pilot, who was soon returned to India. Despite the skirmishes, the two countries seemed to avoid further escalating the situation. Pakistan, meanwhile, began a crackdown on militants, arresting suspected militants, shutting down a large number of religious schools, and announcing its intent to update existing laws according to international standards.

Meanwhile, Khan faced a looming debt crisis. Pakistan’s debt commitments had ballooned over the years preceding his term in office, not least due to the CPEC project financed by loans from China; Pakistan’s first repayments were due to begin in 2019. Khan had campaigned on promises of increased welfare and against seeking intervention from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose lending conditions often required austerity measures and whose previous dozen packages to Pakistan had failed to solve the country’s macroeconomic problems. Indeed, he began his premiership seeking aid from allies rather than from the IMF. In mid-October, having failed to secure foreign aid from allies, Pakistan requested $12 billion in emergency lending from the IMF. Khan continued to seek foreign aid, however, and reached investment arrangements with China in December and with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in January 2019.

With the advent of the global COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, Khan was reluctant to implement a lockdown on the country’s already ailing economy. In Sindh, the province most affected by the pandemic and the only province whose government was not led by either the PTI or an allied party, a strict lockdown was implemented on March 23. As the pandemic worsened across the country, a nationwide lockdown was eventually imposed at the beginning of April until early May, when restrictions began to be lifted in phases.

Opposition to Khan and the PTI flared in late 2020, fueled by allegations of corruption and economic discontent. In September the PML-N, the PPP, and other parties in the opposition formed a coalition, known as the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), which sought to increase the independence of civilian government from the military establishment. The PDM staged protests and rallies—some addressed by Nawaz Sharif, calling by video from exile. With opposition sustained into the following year, Khan sought a vote of confidence in March 2021. He narrowly survived, but the PDM had boycotted the vote.

As the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan returned to power later that year amid the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Pakistan took a largely optimistic stance on the situation. It was hoped that the takeover would bring stability to Pakistan’s border and enhance cooperation between the countries in containing the TTP and other militants that presented a threat to Pakistan’s security. The international community’s patience for the Taliban grew thin, however, as the new regime defaulted toward the style of governance that it had first implemented in the 1990s. Pakistani officials nevertheless lobbied foreign powers to incentivize the Taliban toward moderation and inclusivity.

Sunday, March 13, 2022

Poonch River

Poonch River

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AZAD KASHMIR

Tourism in Azad Kashmir

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History of Pakistan

Background to partition

The Muslim League and Mohammed Ali Jinnah

Birth of the new state

The early republic

Liaquat Ali Khan

Political decline and bureaucratic ascendancy

Military government

From disunion through the Zia al-Huq era

Civil war

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Zia ul-Haq

Political and social fragmentation

The first administration of Benazir Bhutto

The first administration of Nawaz Sharif

The interim government

The second administration of Benazir Bhutto

The second administration of Nawaz Sharif

Continuing challenges: conflict, a stalled economy, and nuclear tests

Growing unrest, tension with the military, and Sharif’s ouster

The Pervez Musharraf government

Relations with the United States, consolidation of Musharraf’s rule, and meetings with India

Hesitant rejection of Islamist militants

Reinstated constitution

Electoral losses and resignation

Pakistan under Zardari

U.S. drone strikes, floods of 2010, and religious tensions

Osama bin Laden discovered and killed

Defeat at the polls

The third administration of Nawaz Sharif

Domestic and foreign policy

Disqualification from office

Arrest and party defeat

Imran Khan’s premiership

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